Plyler vs Doe Does Not Grant Birthright Citizenship to Illegal Aliens

Those that believe that footnote 10 of Plyler vs Doe somehow grants Birthright Citizenship fails to understand the actual statement as made by Justice Brennan.

Appellants seek to distinguish our prior cases, emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause directs a State to afford its protection to persons within its jurisdiction, while the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments contain no such assertedly limiting phrase. In appellants' view, persons who have entered the United States illegally are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within a State's boundaries and subject to its laws. Neither our cases nor the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment support that constricting construction of the phrase "within its jurisdiction." ^[n10] We have never suggested that the class of persons who might avail themselves of the equal protection guarantee is less than coextensive with that entitled to due process. To the contrary, we have recognized [p212] that both provisions were fashioned to protect an identical class of persons, and to reach every exercise of state authority.

Footnote 10 states:

10. Although we have not previously focused on the intended meaning of this phrase, we have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Justice Gray, writing for the Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), detailed at some length the history of the Citizenship Clause, and the predominantly geographic sense in which the term "jurisdiction" was used. He further noted that it was

impossible to construe the words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," in the opening sentence [of the Fourteenth Amendment], as less comprehensive than the words "within its jurisdiction," in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons "within the jurisdiction" of one of the States of the Union are not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."

Id. at 687.

Justice Gray concluded that

[e]very citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States.

Id. at 693. As one early commentator noted, given the historical emphasis on geographic territoriality, bounded only, if at all, by principles of sovereignty and allegiance, no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. See C. Bouve, Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in the United States 425-427 (1912).

This refers to the section of Wong Kim Ark:

[I]t is impossible to construe the words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the opening sentence, as less comprehensive than the words "within its jurisdiction" in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons "within the jurisdiction" of one of the States of the Union are not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."

This paragraph is in conjunction with Gray discussing the case of the Schooner Exchange.

In short, the judgment in the case of The Exchange declared, as incontrovertible principles, that the jurisdiction of every nation within its own territory is exclusive and absolute, and is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by the nation itself; that all exceptions to its full and absolute territorial jurisdiction must be traced up to its own consent, express or implied; that, upon its consent to cede, or to waive the exercise of, a part of its territorial jurisdiction rest the exemptions from that jurisdiction of foreign sovereigns or their armies entering its territory with its permission, and of their foreign ministers and public ships of war, and that the implied license under which private individuals of another nation enter the territory and mingle indiscriminately with its inhabitants for purposes of business or pleasure can never be construed to grant to them an exemption from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found. See also Carlisle v. United States (1872), 16 Wall. 147, 155; Radich v. Hutchins (1877), 95 U.S. 210; Wildenhus' Case (1887), 120 U.S. 1; Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889), 130 U.S. 581, 603, 604.

Note the bolded area, which means that if a person comes here with or without the consent of our Government they are still, by implied license, subject to our laws. This does not grant or bring them (illegal aliens) "within the allegiance" of the USA making them "subject to the jurisdiction" as defined, “Not owing allegiance to anybody else,” by Sen. Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee.

Now, the question is why did footnote 10 end with a quote from Bouvé, Clement Lincoln (Of the Districf of Columbia Bar; Member of the American Society of International Law). A treatise on the laws governing the exclusion and expulsion of aliens in the United States. Washington, D.C. : John Byrne & Co., 1912. In which Bouve is making an argument allowing "domicile" to be the criteria of birthright citizenship and due to this, by virtue of residing here without the consent of our government, they have shown "temporary allegiance".

Does the fact that the parents belong to a class of aliens whose allegiance the United States does not desire and whose entrance into the United States is forbidden by law affect the political status of the child? Obviously not, unless the bare legal prohibition suffices to prevent the parents
from acquiring a residence or domicile — it is immaterial which — in this country. True, the parents never acquired a municipal status by virtue of or under the immigration law ; and they never acquired a lawful domicile in the sense that they were never entitled to enter for the purpose of establishing a home. But the fact remains that they entered this country and proceeded to reside here, until their arrest, in enjoyment of every benefit which the law of the United States confers on persons lawfully resident here, and under the same duty to carry out their correlative obligations. Their temporary allegiance to the United States was complete and gave rise to reciprocal protection on the part of the state, unaffected by the fact that in order to enjoy and exercise the rights and duties incident thereto they had violated the immigration law.

As one should be able to conclude, Gray does not grant automatic birth right citizenship to anybody, it does however claim that WKA is a citizen by definition of his parents being domiciled and residing within the US at the time of his birth, by which his parents owed allegiance to the US as they were permitted to be here by the Treaties agreed to by the Chinese and US Governments. Domiciled as defined by Gray:

Chinese persons, born out of the United States, remaining subjects of the Emperor of China, and not having become citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of, and owe allegiance to, the United States so long as they are permitted by the United States to reside here, and are " subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the same sense as all other aliens residing in the United States. Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356; Law Ow Bew v. United States 144 U.S. 47, 61, 62; Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893), 149 U.S. 698, 724; Lem Moon Sing v. United States (1893), 158 U.S. 538, 547; Wong Wing v. United States (1896), 163 U.S. 228, 238.

Why would Bouve be arguing for BRC to illegal aliens in 1912 if the case of WKA granted BRC to all born within the boundaries of the USA?

Footnote 10 in Plyler vs Doe in NO WAY grants Birthright Citizenship to children born of illegal aliens, or for that matter non-immigrant visa holders, within the borders of the USA.

Wong Kim Ark does not Grant Birthright Citizenship to Children Born of Illegal Aliens

A federal appellate court ruled for Wong Kim Ark, and the government appealed the case to the Supreme Court.

To come to a ruling, the Court had to interpret whether the Fourteenth Amendment truly granted Wong citizenship (The Geary Act requiring all Chinese persons to carry a “resident permit” due to his return from china in 1893), despite being born to two non-citizens who were ineligible to ever become citizens.

At the hearing, the District Attorney of the United States was permitted to intervene in behalf of the United States in opposition to the writ of habeas corpus issued October 2, 1895.

The case was submitted to the decision of the court upon the following facts agreed by the parties: That, at the time of his said birth, his mother and father were domiciled residents of the United States, and had established and enjoyed a permanent domicil and residence therein at said city and county of San Francisco.

It is conceded that, if he is a citizen of the United States, the acts of Congress, known as the Chinese Exclusion Acts, prohibiting persons of the Chinese race, and especially Chinese laborers, from coming into the United States, do not and cannot apply to him.

The question presented by the record is whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States by virtue of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. (this is defined later in Gray’s opinion with: Chinese persons, born out of the United States, remaining subjects of the Emperor of China, and not having become citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of, and owe allegiance to, the United States so long as they are permitted by the United States to reside here, and are " subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the same sense as all other aliens residing in the United States.)

In Minor v. Happersett, "The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that." Gray proceeded to resort to the common law as an aid in the construction of this provision.

In Udny v. Udny, “The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions: one, by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status.”

And then, while maintaining that the civil status is universally governed by the single principle of domicil, the criterion established by international law for the purpose of determining civil status.

The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.

The case of The Charming Betsy, refers to (Jared Shattuck born in Connecticut before the American Revolution) a person born prior to the American Revolution and becoming a US Citizen by way of established law (the US Constitution 1787).

In McCreery v. Somerville, (1824) 9 Wheat. 354, which concerned the title to land in the State of Maryland, it was assumed that children born in that State of an alien who was still living, and who had not been naturalized, were "native-born citizens of the [p662] United States,".

Again, in Levy v. McCartee, “Common Law” practices prior to 1787.

In U. S. v. Rhodes (1866), it merely conveys that “Common Law” is in use prior to the 14^th Amendment ratification of 1868.

Etc., etc. Now we move to the point of Gray interpreting the 14^th Amendment.

At the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, there as any settled and definite rule of international law, generally recognized by civilized nations, inconsistent with the ancient rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion. [p668]

Nor can it be doubted that it is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship.

The “implied license” was in allowing the ship to port, in the Schooner Exchange. Thus those making port are in essence granted status as allowed by the Government, they were “permitted by the United states” to make port.

Chinese persons, born out of the United States, remaining subjects of the Emperor of China, and not having become citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of, and owe allegiance to, the United States so long as they are permitted by the United States to reside here, and are " subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the same sense as all other aliens residing in the United States.

It is true that Chinese persons born in China cannot be naturalized, like other aliens, by proceedings under the naturalization laws. But this is for want of any statute or treaty authorizing or permitting such naturalization, as will appear by tracing the history of the statutes, treaties and decisions upon that subject -- always bearing in mind that statutes enacted by Congress, as well as treaties made by the President and Senate, must yield to the paramount and supreme law of the Constitution.

The Convention between the United States and China of 1894 provided that Chinese laborers or Chinese of any other class, either permanently or temporarily residing in the United States, shall have for the protection of their persons and property all rights that are given by the laws of the United States to citizens of the most favored nation, excepting the right to become naturalized citizens.

The Fourteenth Amendment, while it leaves the power where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship.

No one doubts that the Amendment, as soon as it was promulgated, applied to persons of African descent born in the United States, wherever the birthplace of their parents might have been, and yet, for two years afterwards, there was no statute authorizing persons of that race to be naturalized. It wasn’t until the INA of 1870 that they were “Naturalized”. The point is Wong Kims parents were in this situation, though they were here with the “permission of the USA” (Burlingame Treaty).

The fact, therefore, that acts of Congress or treaties have not permitted Chinese persons born out of this country to become citizens by naturalization, cannot exclude Chinese persons born in this country from the operation of the broad and clear words of the Constitution, "All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."

VII. Upon the facts agreed in this case, the American citizenship which Wong Kim Ark acquired by birth within the United States has not been lost or taken away by anything happening since his birth.

For the reasons above stated, this court is of opinion that the question must be answered in the affirmative.

According to Immigration Lawyer Gary Endelman, J.D., PhD, as stated in Bender's Immigration Bulletin, April 1, 2006, pages 307 - 340, one of the best Immigration Law Journals in publication or on the web:

Critics of birthright citizenship rightly point out that the parents of Wong Kim Ark, though they could never become citizens under the law then in effect, were resident aliens of the United States and their presence here was completely lawful. This is not a case dealing with the children of illegal aliens. Nonetheless, the importance of this case goes far beyond its specific facts. This is the flagship for birthright citizenship whose influence has extended down through many subsequent decisions until the present day. Not since Wong Kim Ark have federal courts seriously questioned birthright citizenship or doubted the meaning of the Citizenship Clause. The reasoning of Wong Kim Ark, namely that the rights of children should not be diminished by the status or conduct of their parents, has been extended by the courts to the protection of children where citizenship is not an issue. Children born out of wedlock, for example, can not be denied insurance for that reason. Children of the undocumented are entitled to a free public education. Newborns of illegal alien mothers must receive the same Medicaid coverage after birth in the United States as the children of citizen mothers. As the Supreme Court has made crystal clear, equal protection extends to “all persons within the territory of the United States,” including those whose presence here is subject to challenge. Precisely because the acceptance of Wong Kim Ark was, before 9/11, virtually universal, because neither the courts nor Congress seriously questioned it or sought to revisit the issue, we have never had any subsequent judicial scrutiny that really examined what the decision said and whether the Court got it right. The Court could have done this when deciding Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, where Hamdi was born in Louisiana while his father was working temporarily in the United States as an L-1 intra-company transferee before returning to Saudi Arabia while Hamdi was still a toddler. Hamdi did not return again to the United States before American military authorities brought him back here as an enemy combatant. However, the Court simply assumed that Hamdi was a citizen and offered no new insights into birthright citizenship. Sadly, however much we might agree or disagree with the wisdom or folly of such an assumption, this was a chance not taken. Had the Court not taken the easy way out, we might have learned some valuable lessons about whether, and to what extent, birthright citizenship has a place in our post-9/11 world.

SB1070 Temporary Injunctions

Upon reading the ruling of SB1070 from Judge Bolton, it clearly allows most of what the law was intended to do, however, there are portions that do appear to extend beyond Federal Law.

I will put up each of the temporary injunctions as allowed by Judge Bolton and follow them with the actual wording from SB1070 and the amendment HB2162. I then will attempt to give there meanings.

Sections of S.B. 1070 are preempted by federal law:

Portion of Section 2 of S.B. 1070
A.R.S. § 11-1051(B): requiring that an officer make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of a person stopped, detained or arrested if there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is unlawfully present in the United States, and requiring verification of the immigration status of any person arrested prior to releasing that person.

B. For any lawful contact STOP, DETENTION OR ARREST made by a law enforcement official or a law enforcement agency of this state or a law enforcement official or a law enforcement agency of a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ANY OTHER LAW OR ORDINANCE OF A COUNTY, CITY OR TOWN OR THIS STATE where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who AND is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person,

Note the use of the word by Judge Bolton "requiring", this simply means that the State of Arizona cannot mandate or force the officer to make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of a person. It in no way says the officer can not do so if (s)he chooses, it is left at the officers discretion.

Section 3 of S.B. 1070
A.R.S. § 13-1509: creating a crime for the failure to apply for or carry alien registration papers

This is for the entire section of 13-1509 overstepping Federal Law, To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, Article 1, Section 8. It is not up to the State level authorities to determine who can or can not be "naturalized", but the State level authorities may in fact question a person of their status if they have reasonable suspicion they are here , it would than be up to DHS and ICE to instruct the officer to either detain the person(s) or allow them to remain under their own recognizance.

Portion of Section 5 of S.B. 1070
A.R.S. § 13-2928(C): creating a crime for an unauthorized alien to solicit, apply for, or perform work

C. It is unlawful for a person who is unlawfully present in the United States and who is an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state.

This portion of 13-2928 is also being temporarily held on account of overstepping Federal Law, as there is no law stating that an entry violator or visa overstay can not apply for work, solicit work, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor at the Federal level. This doesn't mean that they can not be found guilty of employment violations by way of E-Verify or the use of forged documents or for failing to pay taxes. If they make money, they fall within the Federal and State requirements to also report that income.

Section 6 of S.B. 1070
A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(5): authorizing the warrantless arrest of a person where there is probable cause to believe the person has committed a public offense that makes the person removable from the United States

"Plausible Distinction" comes into play here, until it is known or verified that a person is here in violation of immigration law, they do fall under the protections of some aspects of "civil laws".

As you can now see, the "temporary injunction" is limited as to what has been held and is very specific as to what may or may not be authorized. This does allow for more State Congress Amendments to possibly parse the wording of the specified sections to conform to the requirements as set forth by Judge Bolton.

Part 3: The forming of the United States and Naturalization

1773, the Boston Tea Party becomes the fuse to the powder keg of the War for Independence. It is not until 1776, that the Declaration of Independence is adopted by the 1^st Continental Congress, which was nothing more than delegates from the 13 colonies that met first in 1775, they condemn King George III in stating; He has endeavored to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.

We are now in the time of the Articles of Confederation as written by the 2^nd Continental Congress as commissioned in 1776, sent to the states for ratification in 1777, and ratified in 1781 legally federating the sovereign and independent states, already cooperating through the Continental Congress, into a new federation styled the "The United States of America". Under the Articles the states retained sovereignty over all governmental functions not specifically relinquished to the central government.

In deciding the wording and the compromise of creating a federation of sovereign and independent states, the 2^nd Continental Congress would determine what would be constituted as Federal Powers and States Powers, thus creating the first Constitution of the USA, the Articles of Confederation.

In Art. 4, Sec. 1., the only Article dealing with the movement of :

"The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and redress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties impositions and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively."

This is to mean, “free inhabitants” and “free citizens” as already discussed in previous topics as, “those that had colonized through the granting patent company from 1606 – 1619, the London (Virginia) Company, and were then freed by the company allowing them to purchase and own their own lands in the new world and also by the 7 year indentured servant of the Africans brought to the new world by slave traders to be freed at the end of their 7 year term and to also be allowed to purchase and own land.” The true meaning of the word "free," as used in the English law, in the colonial charters, and in the State constitutions up to this time, when applied to persons, was to describe citizens (subjects - today's equivocal, Naturalized or Natural-born), or persons possessed of franchises (denizens - today's equivocal, Legal Resident), as distinguished from aliens (foreigners looking to join the ranks of the colony, must first register with the local governor and obey all laws as instituted for aliens, required to take an oath appointed by Parliament swearing allegiance to the King of England, and live without incident within the colony for 7 years) or persons not possessed of the same franchises. Usage, then, would give this meaning to the word "free" in this section.

The rules of Naturalization were still left up to the individual states, and each state had its own rules. The above, Article 4, only allows "free" persons to actually move freely between the Colonies, now States, and entitled them to “all the privileges and immunities” in the several states.

This was all happening during the American Revolutionary War, to wit, in the end, 1785; the United States was no longer under the rule of Britain. Before the United States won their independence, the states followed the English Common Laws, including the British Naturalization Laws under King James I through King George III, for which all colonizers were subjects of Britain. During this time is when “subjects” of the King of England became “citizens” of the Republic as free men, “He that had owed primary allegiance to the King of England now owed primary allegiance to the United America.”

In 1787, the United States completed the United States Constitution in Pennsylvania and on March 4, 1789, it took effect. The rule to establish a Uniform rule of Naturalization was addressed in Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. “To establish a uniform rule of naturalization,” was the only wording in regards to naturalization in the Constitution.

Part 2: Naturalization Before the American Revolution

During the colonial period, there were no citizens of the United States because there was no such country! For the most part, the colonists living within the British Colonies were subjects of the British Empire with the exceptions of those brought in by the Slave ships or members of other Nations colonies that became acquired by British expansion or War.

In order to have all the rights and privileges of a British subject, one had to become a subject of the British monarch. Therefore, because most of the colonial immigrants were from England and were already British subjects they retained all their rights and privileges in the colonies. There were some immigrants that had previously immigrated to the British Isles from other European countries and were naturalized there before coming to the American colonies, others came directly to the colonies and petitioned to become British subjects.

According to English law, an alien (a stranger, subject to another monarchy with no allegiance to the territorial holding monarchy) could neither hold nor inherit real property, nor pass it to his heirs. If he acquired property it passed to the Crown upon his death. The alien would have to go and submit a letter of intent to the local magistrate, where in they would be given a license allowing them to stay, mandate that they follow all laws which relate to strangers and aliens, and pay double the local tax. After living in the colony for at least 7 years, the alien could apply for a change of status, where the colonial governor could grant by letter of patent the status of “denizen”, a status akin to permanent residency today, for a paid a fee and would take an oath of allegiance to the British Parliament, akin to taking the oath to the US Constitution today. The denizen was not a “natural-born subject”; therefore he did not have any political rights: he could not be a member of parliament or hold any civil or military office.

Colonial naturalization law was made by the Parliament in England. Colonies were not allowed to decide naturalization procedures for themselves. An immigrant coming directly to the colonies would have become naturalized by an act of the colonial governor acting in place of the monarch, or by act of the colonial legislature and would be naturalized as a denizen. Colonial naturalization's prior to 1740 were strictly local in nature and the rights obtained did not extend to other colonies nor to the British Isles. Turning to the attitude of individual colonies, we find Massachusetts upholding, as we should expect, the notion of a close corporation, membership in which was given with great care. Outsiders desiring admission had to seek the permission of the authorities. In 1662, by a resolve of the general court, a few French Protestants were permitted to enter the colony, but it was not until 1700 that a general immigration law was put in force. Every ship coming into the ports of Massachusetts had to furnish to the authorities a list of the passengers, and this was followed a few years later by an act which forbade the importation of poor, infirm, or vicious people. The French Protestants that went there behaved themselves so well that in 1739 an act of naturalization was passed in their favor.

After 1740, the procedure changed. The 1740 Act of Parliament [13 George II, c.7] was entitled "An Act for Naturalizing such foreign Protestants, and others therein mentioned, as are settled or shall settle in any of His Majesty's Colonies in America." It allowed a denizen who had lived seven years in a colony to become “naturalized” by fulfilling certain requirements (such as taking the oath of allegiance and producing a certificate that he had taken the Sacrament in front of witnesses) in the colony of residence. His naturalization applied in England as well as in all of the colonies. The payment for the naturalization under this act was two shillings. Large numbers of denizens, immigrants, (excluding Catholics) became naturalized under this act, their children born after this date became "natural-born subjects".

The spirit of exclusiveness, however, was by no means overthrown, for we find an English traveler writing as late as 1760 that few people of foreign birth were to be found dwelling in Massachusetts. Connecticut was in the habit of demanding an oath of all strangers who came to dwell within her territory. New York had little or no immigration until the coming of the Germans. In fact, Governor Dongan called attention to the small number of immigrants who entered the province after its capture from the Dutch. When immigration did come, it spread into the Mohawk valley and from there into Pennsylvania. Most of the southern colonies offered grants of land to attract settlers (colonists from other British colonies whether natural-born subject or denizen), and the possession of land gave not only material wealth, but also social rank and, generally, political privileges. Acts were passed to secure and guarantee these land-titles, and in some cases taxes were exempted. South Carolina went so far as to prohibit the collection of money for all debts that had been contracted before the person came to the colony. This made the territory a refuge for those who had suffered under the severe English laws and was naturally much disliked by the creditor class.

The colonies employed the same methods of naturalization that England used. Letters of denization were issued by the governors; then there were special acts of the legislature relating to particular persons; and finally there were general naturalization laws. Colonial legislation, however, was much more limited than that of England, for no colony could give any rights outside of its own borders. The naturalization acts gave many valuable rights, such as the privilege to acquire lands and to vote at elections, but that they were not intended to give the newcomers the right to act as factors and merchants or to own vessels, for that would be contrary to the navigation laws. Aliens pleading colonial acts of naturalization as a protection for their trading had their vessels seized and condemned by the courts of admiralty, whose decisions were sustained on appeal to the king in council. Several governors, who were of royal appointment, had given letters of denization, under which aliens had traded contrary to the navigation acts. On this account William ordered that no more letters of denization be granted. The limited character of colonial naturalization is shown in repeated decisions. For example, Chief-Justice North ruled that a Virginian naturalization had merely local effect and did not confer the privileges of citizenship in any other colony. The solicitor-general in 1718 held that a New Jersey act merely gave the rights of a natural-born subject in that province alone, and consequently there would be no harm in approving it.

Naturalization legislation continued to be enacted, and as late as 1773 it was provided that foreign Protestants who had served for two years in any of the royal American regiments could become naturalized under restrictions regarding office-holding in England. It was evident that England had resolved to keep the matter of citizenship under her immediate control; for, in the same year, instructions were issued to all governors in America not to give their consent to any naturalization bill passed by the legislative bodies of the colonies under their charge. The following year, 1774, an act was passed to prevent people from becoming naturalized merely for the sake of claiming the immunities of British subjects in foreign trade.

New England and especially Massachusetts Bay turned a cold shoulder to new-comers, and received with but few exceptions only those that strengthened the narrow theocratic state, on the whole strangers were welcomed; for the greatest need of America was men to develop the resources of the country. The seventeenth century drew its immigrants from England, Ireland, and Scotland, while most of the foreigners that came here were French Protestants. The eighteenth century marked a great change in colonization, for modern methods were brought into use, and the movement became more general. The foreign immigrants went chiefly to the central and southern colonies, this being especially true of the Germans and the Scotch-Irish. New England, on the other hand, kept strict watch over all immigrants. Consequently that part of the country remained more purely English than any other. The immigrants found their way to the frontiers, where they cleared the land and formed a bulwark against the Indians. New York and Virginia seemed, with that definite object in mind, to push the strangers to the west.