We are all immigrants? Maybe, but not during the colonization of this country, it's not until much later when a man would be able to come here of his own accord as a "freeman" and not as a "subject" of the King of England.
The first settlements, in what is now the USA, were actually Conquistadors, Soldiers and Explorers, early history shows the Chinese have records showing "trees of Red wood" around 498A.D. from the west coast, the Vikings landed around 1000A.D. on the north eastern coast of Canada and possibly as far south as modern day New England, later arrivals from Spain, Portugal, France and the Netherlands date to around 1513. The Spanish also laid claim to the entire west coast of what is now the USA in 1513; they did start colonies in St. Augustine, Florida as early as 1565 and New Mexico in 1598, while the French had their first colonies in South Carolina since 1562. In 1579 English Explorers also claimed the west coast of North America; The Russians laid claim to parts of the west coast, mostly from Northern California to Alaska, but not until around 1812.
The British didn’t begin to colonize the now USA until 1584, in what was called Virginia back then. This first colony failed. After Queen Elizabeth’s death, King James I established by Royal Charter, The London Company, in 1606 with the sole purpose of establishing colonial settlements in North America, the first being the Charter of Virginia in 1606. It wasn’t until 1607, when the Virginia colony of Jamestown became the first permanent English settlement founded by the London Company (later known as the Virginia Company).
In 1619, the Colony of Virginia started its first legislative assembly, known as the House of Burgesses. The Virginia Company decided to end its monopoly on land ownership believing the colonists would display greater initiative if they could gain ownership of land and would encourage private investment in the colony. The Virginia Company designed four large corporations termed cities to encompass the developed portions of the colony. The Virginia Company officials adopted English Common Law as the basis in the colony, replacing the British appointed Governor as the final voice on legal matters. The changes of 1619 also created a legislative body to be elected by the colonists that would meet once annually at Jamestown.
In 1619, a Dutch man-of-war entered the James River and landed on Virginia soil with twenty Africans for sale. Africans were used as indentured servants, serving a master for sevens years, then freed. They would now have to apply to become "denizens" (persons admitted to residence in a foreign country, through documented registration accepted by the Acts of the Royal Governor or Proprietor of the colony, with limited rights as compared to subjects), this practice was in use up to 1740. Colonial denizen (naturalization) prior to 1740 was strictly local in nature and the rights obtained did not extend to other colonies nor to the British Isles. If you moved to another colony, you would have to also become naturalized there. If an immigrant obtained his naturalization in England, however, the naturalization extended to all of the colonies and British Isles. Many became farmers themselves acquiring African servants for their own use. Though as greed came into play over the next few decades, there developed a worldwide desire for slavery, and planters in the New World who wanted a steady labor force could see the major benefits of slave labor. To accommodate the demand for slavery, Virginia adopted new laws in 1650, establishing that Africans arriving in new cargoes would be servants for life, as would their children and their children's children.
After 1618, the death of the Powhatan Chief and escalating hostilities between the confederacy of native tribes of Eastern Virginia and the colonists, the new Powhatan chief Opechancanough sought in vain to drive off the encroaching English. His large-scale attacks in 1622 and 1644 met strong reprisals by the English, resulting in the near elimination of the tribe. By 1646 the Powhatan Confederacy was largely destroyed, in part due to infectious diseases to which they had no immunity. By this time, the leaders of the colony were desperate for labor to develop the land.
The “Pilgrims” of 1620 and their landing at Plymouth Rock are probably the most noteworthy as taught in History classes in the USA. Most in this group were “Separatists ” because they demanded a complete separation from the State Church of England. They wanted to worship in a very simple manner without all of the ritual and symbols which were used in the Anglican Church. In their study of the Bible they had decided the original church in New Testament times had been a simple church and they wished to follow that example in their own worship. They believed there were so many changes needed to be made in the Anglican Church that it could not be accomplished to their satisfaction. Therefore, the only possibility for them was to "separate" completely from the state church. Their pastor, Richard Clyfton, had guided this religious community into a form of democratic self-governance. Various points of view were tolerated, but the will of the majority ruled in decision-making. They first went to Holland in 1608 after failed attempts to leave England in 1607 and settled in Leiden, Holland. They asked King James for a Royal Charter to allow them to establish a colony in the New World which was denied, but King James told them he would not try to stop them from settling abroad. The group finally succeeded in getting a Patent from the Virginia Company and was forced to agree to terms which indentured them for seven years before they would be free to own land or take profits for themselves.
Upon arriving off the coast of Cape Cod, even before the Mayflower anchored, there was a near mutiny. Some of the Leiden Separatists thought they could do as they pleased since they were, as they believed outside the bounds of English Law, thus they came up with what is known as The Mayflower Compact. The Compact was an agreement signed by all the men on board-including the indentured servants-promising to abide by laws that would be drawn up and agreed upon by all male members of the community. The women were not allowed to participate in the governing process. The Compact states that they would choose their own leaders and make their own laws. It also stated there was to be equal justice for all. This Compact became the constitution of the Plymouth Colony. It was the first document of American democracy to establish "government of the people, by the people, for the people."
From 1620 through 1732 other colonies were formed and settled by recruiters for financial backers of corporations in Britain and by other countries looking to make their claim here. The other Nations colonies eventually became acquired as the English colonies grew. As these other Nations colonies were acquired, those colonizers who refused to swear loyalty to the British crown were expelled from the territory or forced deeper into the western wilderness beyond the territory as claimed by England.
In June 1624, King James I assumed responsibility for the colony of Virginia after he dissolved the Virginia Company of London, thus the Virginia Colony became a Crown Colony. He ordered Virginia's leaders to make a record of the colony's inhabitants and their provisions. This census-known as the 1624/5 Muster-is the first comprehensive account of households in British North America. In addition, it is the only extant census for seventeenth-century Virginia. The 1624/5 Muster is a house-to-house survey that contains information about the location of households in Virginia, the individuals in each household and the ties that connected the colony's early residents to one another.
In 1634, the first counties were laid out to replace the old system of corporations and private plantations.
In 1639, the first law passed, was "an act to compel physicians and surgeons to declare on oath the value of their medicines."
In 1640, as the present Massachusetts Act goes back, with no substantial change to the origin of the system, it must be sought before that date, which narrows our enquiry (sic)to the few colonies settled before that time; and we must first examine the system of Virginia, the colony first settled.
In 1641, at the formation of The Massachusetts Body of Liberties, Virginia raised her protest against the continuance of slave traffic, but New England raised a voice of objection, and uniting her influence with that of South Carolina and Georgia secured the continuance of the slave trade for twenty years more, by Constitutional provision.
As you can see (bold above), many of our laws have been incorporated into the USA since its first English colonies were established by British Royal Charter to Corporations investing in the New World. This is but a small portion of how our Constitution and Laws came about. You may also note that the USA was formed by way of colonizers from Britain (Colonists are, as defined during the time, people who were to inhabit or populate an area based on the claims made by an exploring country, to somehow give credibility to the sending countries claimed territories and were nothing more than sharecroppers meant to benefit the Empire), as "subjects" of the British Empire. Even the Pilgrims of 1620 came over on a granted Patent as colonizers from the Virginia Company. It wouldn’t be until the Declaration of Independence and the separation claimed from Great Britain that the 13 Colonies become truly free independent and Sovereign States.
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Tuesday, May 25, 2010
SB1070 and those who are benevolent
Why is it that Lawyers always think they know everything? Why is it that they fail to actually understand and/or read what they opine about? In a CNN opinion article written by Chandra Bhatnagar, he claims that the Arizona law is in some way violating the ICERD based on an underscore of UN experts writing a letter of discontent.
Mr. Bhatnagar states:
The problem with his meager claim is two fold; first the Arizona Law is not an immigration law it is a criminal law which is pretty much what is already a law in California, and second the ICERD that Mr. Bhatnagar refers to allows in Article 1.2: Distinctions made on the basis of citizenship (that is, between citizens and non-citizens) are specifically excluded from the definition, as are affirmative action policies and other measures taken to redress imbalances and promote equality.
So then why all the "boycott" of Arizona? Where is the "boycott" of California?
Mr. Bhatnagar states:
The law flies in the face of Arizona's human rights obligations, particularly the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), which the United States ratified in 1994 and which is binding on all levels of federal, state and local governments, including Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer, who signed the bill.
The problem with his meager claim is two fold; first the Arizona Law is not an immigration law it is a criminal law which is pretty much what is already a law in California, and second the ICERD that Mr. Bhatnagar refers to allows in Article 1.2: Distinctions made on the basis of citizenship (that is, between citizens and non-citizens) are specifically excluded from the definition, as are affirmative action policies and other measures taken to redress imbalances and promote equality.
So then why all the "boycott" of Arizona? Where is the "boycott" of California?
Monday, May 17, 2010
The Significance of Domicile in Interprating Birth Right Citizenship
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes citizenship as a birthright for all children born in the United States, so long as they are “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Territorial birth, “subject to the jurisdiction” requires a mutual consensual relationship between individuals and the U.S. political community; children of undocumented immigrants, lacking such a relationship, are thus putatively precluded from constitutional birthright citizenship.
The 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause draws heavily on the text of a similar citizenship provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, written by Senator Lyman Trumbull. In a letter to President Andrew Johnson summarizing the draft Act, Trumbull said that birthright citizenship depended on whether the parents of children born in the United States were living permanently, “domiciled,” here.
Domicile had an unambiguous definition in 1866: one acquired domicile in a nation or a particular place by moving there with the intention of making it one’s permanent residence. Only two prerequisites must be satisfied for domicile to exist: “residence; and . . . intention of making it the home of the [person]”.
Taking domicile to be the birthright citizenship standard may just limit bestowed citizenship upon birth much better than the allegiance argument as used today to interpret the 14th Amendment. First, children born within the territorial boundaries of the United States are U.S. citizens (or not) based on their parents’ domicile, not citizenship or political status. Using domicile as the benchmark also contradicts today's argument that “subject to the jurisdiction” refers not to universally applicable territorial jurisdiction, but a narrower, “political” type. To gain domicile in 1868, one had only to have lived within the territory and planned to permanently remain; one did not need to first transfer one’s sovereign allegiance. Any new “national character” that one took on through acquiring domicile in a new country was merely “adventitious,” and could “be thrown off at pleasure” by leaving the country without intent to return. This is not exactly lasting political affiliation or allegiance.
The 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause draws heavily on the text of a similar citizenship provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, written by Senator Lyman Trumbull. In a letter to President Andrew Johnson summarizing the draft Act, Trumbull said that birthright citizenship depended on whether the parents of children born in the United States were living permanently, “domiciled,” here.
Domicile had an unambiguous definition in 1866: one acquired domicile in a nation or a particular place by moving there with the intention of making it one’s permanent residence. Only two prerequisites must be satisfied for domicile to exist: “residence; and . . . intention of making it the home of the [person]”.
A person could change domicile by leaving one jurisdiction and settling in another, regardless of whether those jurisdictions were states within a country or separate nations. In certain international contexts (such as neutrality agreements), acquiring domicile resulted in “a national character [being] impressed upon a person, different from that which permanent allegiance gives him”; such a person, though, could easily choose to cast off that “national character” by returning to his or her native country. Domicile and citizenship were thus distinct from one another, and acquiring the former in a new country did not alter the latter.Now let's discuss allegiance, the “complete, political jurisdiction” over an individual that flows from the individual’s “allegiance to the sovereign.” Allegiance involves renouncing their previous allegiance, or at least formally demonstrating “commitment” to the United States by obtaining permanent resident status and assuming the “contributive responsibilities” of citizens. Further, affiliation must be met with the “reciprocal consent . . . of the nation to [the individual’s] membership.”
Taking domicile to be the birthright citizenship standard may just limit bestowed citizenship upon birth much better than the allegiance argument as used today to interpret the 14th Amendment. First, children born within the territorial boundaries of the United States are U.S. citizens (or not) based on their parents’ domicile, not citizenship or political status. Using domicile as the benchmark also contradicts today's argument that “subject to the jurisdiction” refers not to universally applicable territorial jurisdiction, but a narrower, “political” type. To gain domicile in 1868, one had only to have lived within the territory and planned to permanently remain; one did not need to first transfer one’s sovereign allegiance. Any new “national character” that one took on through acquiring domicile in a new country was merely “adventitious,” and could “be thrown off at pleasure” by leaving the country without intent to return. This is not exactly lasting political affiliation or allegiance.
If domicile is the appropriate standard, individuals born here and subject to our laws would not be “subject to the jurisdiction” for citizenship purposes if their parents were here only temporarily. Using domicile in this way is thus more restrictive than the pure territorial approach: it requires parents to have some meaningful ties to the country in which they are living for children born there to be citizens.Domicile requires individuals to integrate themselves into a nation’s social fabric through residence such that they consider it their home and have no plans to leave. Beyond residence, it requires that an individual seek, and the country accept, affiliation between the individual and the government of the country. Thus, those here on non-immigrant visas should not have bestowed upon their children born within the boundaries of the United States of America, birthright citizenship, as they themselves are not intending to permanently reside or be domiciled within the USA, and they do not intend to give their "allegiance" to the US Constitution. This should also deny children born to illegal immigration entry violators, birthright citizenship.
The case for Arizona's SB1070
The argument over States Rights and immigration is a fairly new ordeal. The CLEAR Act of 2003 and the Homeland Security Enhancement Act of 2003 has prompted many to question what role state and local law enforcement agencies should have in the enforcement of immigration law. Directly from the CRS Report for Congress; Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement, March 2004.
Congress, through various amendments to the INA, has gradually broadened the authority for state and local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration law, and some recent statutes have begun to carve out possible state roles in the enforcement of civil matters. The legislative proposals that have been introduced, however, would appear to expand the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the civil regulatory aspects of immigration law (i.e., identifying and detaining deportable aliens for purposes of removal).
Although there is quite a bit of debate with respect to state and local law enforcement officers’ authority to enforce immigration law as a matter of practice, it is permissible for state and local law enforcement officers to inquire into the status of an immigrant during the course of their normal duties in enforcing state and local law. This practice allows state and local law enforcement officers to play an indirect role that is incidental to their general criminal enforcement authority.
For example, when state or local officers question the immigration status of someone they have detained for a state or local violation, they may contact an ICE agent at the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). The federal agent may then place a detainer on the suspect, requesting the state official to keep the suspect in custody until a determination can be made as to the suspect’s immigration status. However, the continued detention of such a suspect beyond the needs of local law enforcement, and solely designed to aid in enforcement of federal immigration laws, may be unlawful.
The power to prescribe rules as to which aliens may enter the U.S. and which aliens may be removed solely resides with the federal government. It has generally been assumed that state and local officers may enforce the criminal provisions of the INA if state law permits them to do so but are assumed to be precluded from directly enforcing the INA’s civil provisions. State enforcement of the criminal provisions of the INA is seen as being consistent with the state’s police power to make arrests for criminal acts and the expectation that states are expected to cooperate in the enforcement of federal criminal laws.
However, civil violations of the INA are also found to be within the jurisdictional authority of the state and local law enforcement. In the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Salinas-Calderon, a state trooper pulled over the defendant for driving erratically but soon found six individuals in the back of the defendant’s truck. The court determined that the trooper had "probable cause" to detain and arrest all the individuals. In United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, an Oklahoma police officer arrested a Hispanic male suspected of drug dealing because he was an “illegal alien.”
Clearly preemption does not bar state and local immigration enforcement where Congress has evidenced intent to authorize such enforcement. In exercising its power to regulate immigration, Congress is free to delegate to the states, among other things, the activities of arresting, holding, and transporting aliens. Indeed, Congress already has created avenues for the participation of state and local officers in the enforcement of the federal immigration laws.
Congress defined our nation’s immigration laws in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. §§1101 et seq.), which contains both criminal and civil enforcement measures. Historically, the authority for state and local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration law has been construed to be limited to the criminal provisions of the INA; by contrast, the enforcement of the civil provisions, which includes apprehension and removal of deportable aliens, has strictly been viewed as a federal responsibility, with states playing an incidental supporting role.
Congress, through various amendments to the INA, has gradually broadened the authority for state and local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration law, and some recent statutes have begun to carve out possible state roles in the enforcement of civil matters. The legislative proposals that have been introduced, however, would appear to expand the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the civil regulatory aspects of immigration law (i.e., identifying and detaining deportable aliens for purposes of removal).
Alien Criminal Apprehension Program
The Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP) was established in 1991 by the former INS. Through ACAP, criminal aliens are identified by immigration officials after they have been notified by state and local law enforcement officials. Upon an encounter with an immigrant whose immigration status may be in question, state and local law enforcement officials notify immigration officials, who determine the immigrant’s status and, if applicable, take the immigrant into federal custody.
Although there is quite a bit of debate with respect to state and local law enforcement officers’ authority to enforce immigration law as a matter of practice, it is permissible for state and local law enforcement officers to inquire into the status of an immigrant during the course of their normal duties in enforcing state and local law. This practice allows state and local law enforcement officers to play an indirect role that is incidental to their general criminal enforcement authority.
For example, when state or local officers question the immigration status of someone they have detained for a state or local violation, they may contact an ICE agent at the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). The federal agent may then place a detainer on the suspect, requesting the state official to keep the suspect in custody until a determination can be made as to the suspect’s immigration status. However, the continued detention of such a suspect beyond the needs of local law enforcement, and solely designed to aid in enforcement of federal immigration laws, may be unlawful.
The power to prescribe rules as to which aliens may enter the U.S. and which aliens may be removed solely resides with the federal government. It has generally been assumed that state and local officers may enforce the criminal provisions of the INA if state law permits them to do so but are assumed to be precluded from directly enforcing the INA’s civil provisions. State enforcement of the criminal provisions of the INA is seen as being consistent with the state’s police power to make arrests for criminal acts and the expectation that states are expected to cooperate in the enforcement of federal criminal laws.
To the degree that it is not preempted, the authority of state and local law enforcement officers to investigate and arrest for violations of federal law is determined by reference to state law. This may be done through express authorization in state law. However, this may not be necessary according to some recent decisions from the Tenth Circuit that appear to suggest that state and local law enforcement officers may possess “inherent authority” within their respective jurisdictions to investigate and make arrests for criminal immigration matters.
However, civil violations of the INA are also found to be within the jurisdictional authority of the state and local law enforcement. In the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Salinas-Calderon, a state trooper pulled over the defendant for driving erratically but soon found six individuals in the back of the defendant’s truck. The court determined that the trooper had "probable cause" to detain and arrest all the individuals. In United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, an Oklahoma police officer arrested a Hispanic male suspected of drug dealing because he was an “illegal alien.”
The defendant argued that the state police could only arrest him in accordance with the restrictions detailed in 8 U.S.C. §1252c and since his arrest did not meet the requirements of that provision, it was unauthorized. The Tenth Circuit, however, ultimately concluded that §1252c “does not limit or displace the preexisting general authority of state or local police officers to investigate and make arrests for violations of federal law, including immigration law. Instead, §1252c merely creates an additional vehicle for the enforcement of federal immigration law.”
Clearly preemption does not bar state and local immigration enforcement where Congress has evidenced intent to authorize such enforcement. In exercising its power to regulate immigration, Congress is free to delegate to the states, among other things, the activities of arresting, holding, and transporting aliens. Indeed, Congress already has created avenues for the participation of state and local officers in the enforcement of the federal immigration laws.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
Their own Racism is OK
Don't you think its funny when people are offended by something that they make such a big to-do about it, that they get it dropped from stores selling that item. I am talking about nothing other than the Illegal Alien costume that was found to be offensive to the Illegal Immigrant advocates. One in particular, the Indigenous Xicano, I have talked about his racism before, but now he has truly shown it without covering it up. I wonder, since he has pictures of Conquistadors along with pilgrams, doesn't that mean that his ancestors were also Illegal Immigrants, or do they in some way not count because he doesn't claim them? Inquiring minds truly want to know!!
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